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Introduction
The events of September 11th changed U.S. national security strategy. In a matter of hours the world became smaller and more dangerous. The new administration, vowing to do all it could to prevent future terrorist attacks, adopted a more proactive national security strategy.
Nonetheless, lessons learned prior to September 11 th are relevant to efforts within the "war on This paper proposes that USPACOM support Manila by following a humble, discerning, and patient plan that highlights three lessons learned from the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador.
ii These lessons are: (1) a smaller military presence is better, (2) a reform-minded host government is necessary, and (3) goodwill, rather than military defeat of the insurgents, is the most effective goal. Each lesson recognizes that internal, rather than external, forces warrant U.S. military attention.
First, a brief review of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador during the 1980s is presented. Second, three lessons learned from the Salvadorian experience are introduced. Third, the current situation in the Philippines is discussed. Finally, the lessons learned in El Salvador are applied to the Philippines. This approach is significant because it (1) appreciates subtle and not-so-subtle differences between principles of MOOTW and the principles of war, (2) highlights the importance of shaping the environment, and (3) recognizes that treating the insurgency in the Philippines as a Jihad-inspired revolution is simplistic and a detraction from real root causes. Appendix A is a list of principles of MOOTW and principles of war. Appendix B is a notional framework for USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan for the Philippines.
Analysis

El Salvador Review
In 1979, El Salvador is fragmented due to extremes at both ends of the spectrum.
Socially, the numerous Salvadoran poor have minimal services: 60 percent of the population has no access to piped water and 80 percent of the population has no sewage. In El Salvador, there is racism against Indians and mixed bloods. A racism that helps the insurgents recruit both Indians and mixed bloods. In the Philippines, there is prejudice feed hatred between Muslims and Catholics. These deep-seated prejudices detract from attempts to negotiate compromises. An associated problem is high levels of violence in both environments.
The violent nature of the communist insurgents, El Salvadoran government death squads, and a growing list of atrocities perpetrated by ASG are well documented. Next, the lessons learned from El Salvador are applied to the Philippines.
Application
The With boots on the ground and a relatively robust logistical tail, USPACOM is in a good position to provide manpower and other resources to support infrastructure development. The value of such endeavors is immeasurable. The long-term positive effect of a small unit of U.S. and
Philippine military personnel entering a village and leaving improvements, however small, is far reaching when it comes to intelligence and allegiance. Uncommitted Muslims need to make a decision and benevolent, no strings attached, community improvements can only help tilt the scales toward Manila.
In a similar fashion, USPACOM should realize that the military defeat of the insurgency is not the only answer. For that reason, goodwill between the Philippine government and the insurgents is also crucial. Increasing goodwill, rather than killing insurgents, is a more effective military goal. Along these lines, a program of amnesty, bounties, and rewards is useful.
lxxv Although killing the enemy is often the easiest alternative, neutralizing the enemy does not necessarily mean killing the enemy. Getting insurgents to turn themselves in often leads to a domino effect based on additional intelligence and a devastating impact on those insurgents that, for the time being, remain in the fight. lxxvi Insurgents that surrender or are captured alive have a more significant effect on the overall success of the counterinsurgency effort.
Once the insurgents come into the custody of the Philippine government, it is important that they are treated with dignity and respect for moral, law of war, and practical reasons and U.S. personnel should encourage such treatment. From a practical standpoint, positive treatment is more likely to lead to not only subsequent surrenders and turn-ins, but also intelligence coups.
Establishing goodwill early and often will create an atmosphere that promotes a non-violent and lasting end to a longstanding and bitter dispute.
The preference for a negotiated end to the insurgency requires the Philippine government to re-examine its policy not to negotiate with the ASG. Although ASG has perpetrated numerous heinous acts and justice is warranted individually, the door should remain open to a negotiated settlement collectively. Ending the "no negotiation with ASG" position helps isolate the ASG.
A successful resolution of the struggle with the MILF via negotiation should remain a high priority, if not for the only reason that a lasting peace with the MILF will also tend to isolate the ASG.
Premortem
Not every thesis survives the test of time. One could argue that consequential differences between the El Salvador and Philippine environments severely limit the applications of lessons learned.
First, the war on terrorism and the war on communism are not comparable. The former is an uncompromising struggle with religion at its core and an attack on U.S. soil on its resume, while the latter is a traditional geopolitical struggle for economic and political control or at least 
Conclusion
What USPACOM needs in the Philippines is a humble, discerning, and patient policy.
Humble in the sense that USPACOM accepts the need for a relatively small military presence in a supporting role. lxxix Discerning in the sense that USPACOM pays attention to the desires of the population in southern Philippines. Patient in the sense that USPACOM understands establishing goodwill takes time, perhaps decades. In the end, victory will occur after the misery of the uncommitted Muslims in southern Philippines is replaced with a hope of a better life and faith in the ability of Manila to deliver it.
USPACOM should realize that rushing off to combat terrorism in the Philippines will fail without appreciating lessons learned and MOOTW principles. USPACOM's optic needs to assimilate these pre-September 11 th realities. Although much has changed since September 11 th , much has also remained the same. President John F. Kennedy was right over 30 years ago when he declared " [t] he ability to change is indispensable; however, the ability to hold onto that which is good is equally indispensable."
Notional Theater Security Cooperation Plan for the
Philippines
Objective
Shape Philippine environment within an interagency and collective framework to support (1) U.S. efforts to decrease the potential of attacks on U.S. targets (both at home and abroad), (2) Philippine efforts to neutralize terrorist groups within the Philippines, and (3) Philippine efforts to address Mindanao's root economic and social problems.
Security
Emphasize inherent right of self-defense.
Minimize carrying of visible weapons.
Help advertise bounties, amnesty and rewards.
Enhance and support electronic and human intelligence gathering efforts.
Unity of Effort
Explore and formalize unique interagency arrangements with U.S., Philippine, private, and International agencies. Encourage Philippine government to use bounties, amnesty, and rewards.
Establish robust communication, command, and control capabilities with Philippine military and other officials.
Restraint
Encourage humane treatment of all captured insurgents.
Emphasize disciplined use of force.
Conduct small, below the radar exercises, exercises with Philippine entities.
Use noncombatant forces whenever possible.
Explain to the Philippine government, early and often, that the United States has no intentions of providing significantly large numbers of combat troops to support the counterinsurgency.
Perseverance
Remain sensitive to long-term strategic goals.
Establish and formalize long-term relationships with community and government leaders.
Resist all efforts to suggest and/or communicate that the end of the insurgency is imminent or guaranteed.
Help Philippine government efforts to educate its population that a successful counterinsurgency will require a sustained long-term effort.
Legitimacy
Coordinate and support infrastructure development via engineering exercises.
Visit communities with Philippine military and other Philippine officials.
Encourage Philippine government to pursue reform.
Support Philippine efforts to determine the needs of their population.
Help communicate reform efforts and successes.
Help communicate excesses and atrocities of insurgents.
